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Introduction
Why did Yugoslavia fall apart? Was its violent demise inevitable? Did its
population simply fall victim to the lure of nationalism? How did this multinational state manage to survive for so long? And where do we situate the short
life of Yugoslavia in the long history of the twentieth century? This book tells
the story of why and under which conditions Yugoslavia was created, what
held the multinational state together for more than seventy years, and why it
finally broke apart in violence. It is a tale of confidence and doubt, of progress
and decline, of extremes and excesses, of utopia and demise.
No other European country was as colorful, multifaceted, or complex
as Yugoslavia. Its turbulent history made it a byword for Balkan confusion
and animosity; it stood for the backward, barbaric, and abhorrent contrast to
the supposedly so civilized European continent. At the end of the nineteenth
century, to cross the Danube by steamboat from the Austrian city of Semlin
(Zemun) to Belgrade or travel by the Hungarian state railway over the great
iron Sava Bridge to reach the train station of Bosanski Brod was to enter an
exotic world that appeared both mysterious and fabulous but also at times
appalling and threatening.1 Shrouded in such mystery and foreignness, “the
Balkans” were consistently written out of the European context, as unfortunately still happens occasionally even today. However, a closer look soon
dispels this shroud of mystery, because the region is tightly intertwined in the
timeline of Europe’s history in both good and bad ways. Although popular
images and stereotypes of a backward and violence-ridden “European other”
have since been debunked as a “convenient prejudice,” the idea of the region’s
structural backwardness persists, without the least empirical evidence.2
In contrast, this book addresses Yugoslav history from the perspective
of the major social, economic, and intellectual changes that affected all of
Europe at the turn of the twentieth century and marked its transition to modern
industrialized mass society. The “great acceleration” first reached Western
societies but soon expanded out toward the European periphery.3 The emphasis here will not be primarily on structures of the longue durée and the
unique developments in Balkan history, but on the overarching dynamics of
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change, on interrelations and interaction, and on common European features
and parallels during the “long twentieth century.” 4
In Southeast Europe, the economy, social relations, cultural expression,
mentalities, and daily life were undergoing fundamental transformation in the
decades around 1900. The region also faced unanticipated challenges from the
scientific-technological and economic progress of the West. Growing international competition and aggressive imperialism made it imperative to overcome
backwardness as a matter of survival, in a very literal sense. It was against this
background that the South Slavic idea took shape: the project of a common
political future for culturally related peoples unified in a single state. After all,
the liberation from foreign rule and the founding of an independent and sovereign Yugoslavia appeared to be the premise for securing a self-determined
future in Europe.
Twice, in 1918 and 1945, Yugoslavia became a reality, each time with
a thoroughly different political system: first as a centralized, constitutional,
and parliamentary monarchy, then as a one-party socialist federation. Both
models faced four fundamental long-term problems: the unresolved national
question that challenged the identity and cohesion of the state; the underdevelopment and poverty in a predominantly peasant society; and the dependence
on foreign political and economic powers. These three problems exacerbated
the fourth, namely the enormous historical, cultural, and socioeconomic disparities between the various components of multiethnic Yugoslavia, which
repeatedly raised anew issues concerning political legitimacy and a suitable
constitutional order.
One of the main questions addressed here is how, under these circumstances, development and progress were conceived at various times and what
means were employed to pursue them. An increasing number of the elite
believed that they were living in an age in which tradition, customs, patriarchy, and long-existing community relations were vanishing — and should
vanish — to make way for the advantages and merits of modernity, specifically
of a world of expanding technology. However, competing political forces and
intellectuals embraced very different answers to the coercions, aspirations,
and challenges of a dramatically changing world. Who were the agents driving social change, and how did they envision the future? What alternatives to
Western modernity were discussed?
The approach adopted in this book distances itself from popular explanations of the Yugoslav problem that emphasize ethnic, religious, and cultural
divisions, or incompatible and even “clashing” civilizations. Instead of notorious Balkan intractability and ancient hatreds, the argument presented here
stresses the politicization of differences in twentieth-century modern mass
society. Peoples, nations, and cultures are not transhistorical entities; they

Introductionxi

are subject to historical realities and change, and so are conflicts. A central
question thus focuses on why, how, and under what conditions ethnic identity
and diversity were turned into a matter of contention and by whom. Important
are the interests, views, and motives of the major actors, the socioeconomic
developments, and, last but not least, the cultural-historical dimensions of
collective experiences, memories, and interpretations of history.
Very few scholars have yet attempted to provide a comprehensive history
of Yugoslavia covering the entire twentieth century.5 The pickings are particularly thin in the literature of the Yugoslav successor states.6 Even before the
wars of the 1990s, it was a tricky business to seek a common denominator
among the various regional and national perspectives. Federalism, also in
the realm of academia, granted each people its own way of dealing with its
past, its own national images and narratives of its history. As a result, no
master narrative ever evolved that was supported by all: too different, too
politically laden were the interpretations and depictions. Quarrels over interpretation cut short the multivolume History of the Yugoslav Peoples at the
year 1800. Likewise, the History of the Yugoslav Communist Party/League of
Communists disappeared into oblivion. Nor did the historical contributions to
the Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia fare any better. Since the country’s inception
there has never been a standard narrative about Yugoslavia’s origins, historical
development, and problems. So far, everyone attempting the task has ended
up in the crossfire of criticism.7
In stark contrast to the scarcity of general comprehensive works is the
overabundance of books and articles dealing with the Yugoslav wars of the
1990s. For the most part, they interpret Yugoslavia’s history from the perspective of its bloody demise, analyze its congenital defects, and characterize
the creation of the South Slavic state as artificial in order to underscore the
inevitability of its failure. Yet Yugoslavia cannot be explained only by the
way it began or the way it ended. The state existed for a good seventy years,
which raises the question about what held its peoples together for so long and
what eventually divided them, a question that has not become obsolete since
Yugoslavia fell apart. This book attempts to avoid deterministic explanations
and to grasp the history of Yugoslavia as an essentially open-ended process
from different thematic approaches.
Many recent studies no longer deal with Yugoslavia but concentrate entirely on its successor states. The existence of Slovenia, Croatia, or Kosovo
today is interpreted retrospectively and the past is read teleologically, as if distant history was a harbinger of modern statehood. Interactions with neighbors
are often presented only in the form of conflicts and wars. In the process, the
Yugoslav period is reduced to a very short — albeit not completely insignificant — episode in a centuries-long national history. By contrast, the objective
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of this book is to encapsulate various local and national historical perspectives
and place them in relation to one another, which then relativizes many an alleged regional particularity. However, in order to maintain a balance between
diversity and unity, the various republics and peoples can only be treated in
an illustrative manner. In many instances, Eastern Bosnia serves as the microhistorical example, for it is the proverbial heart of Yugoslavia over which
many sides have fought in the course of the twentieth century.
This book is conceived as a topically comprehensive but compact approach to a complex, almost boundless, subject whose potential for study is
far from exhausted. It is based in part on my own research but primarily on a
broad scope of secondary literature. Publications on specific topics and time
periods are numerous, but syntheses remain few and far between, and there are
many areas in which little or no research has been done. This is particularly
true with regard to the post-1945 period.
Every general overview needs a perspective and a focal point that decide
how to select topics and questions. No narrative, therefore, can do without
condensing and generalizing. Certain subjects that are the standard narrative
of Yugoslavia’s political history were kept short so as to better examine the
deeper underlying socioeconomic and cultural dynamics and the daily life of
common people in addition to the events and major actors. The chronological
narrative alternates with cross-sectional analyses, which offers a deeper look
into society and culture at a given period of time. A lack of space in the endnotes prevented the extensive citation of each important work that influenced
this book. To facilitate readability, reference is often made to “Yugoslavs,”
namely to citizens with no mention of their ethnic affiliation. Nationality was
specified only when the way people identified themselves was relevant to
explain certain contexts.
Terminology, in this context, is a real minefield. Should one speak of nations, nationalities, or ethnic groups? Did peoples speak different languages or
just varieties or dialects of one common language? Notions of all these terms
have changed over time, as will be discussed here, and they have been and
still are a matter of political disputes.
Interpretations of the Yugoslav past are even more emotionally laden, and
discussions are often conducted not with factual but with moral arguments.
Opposing interpretations of history provide explosive material for political
confrontation. Those who do not clearly choose one side or another quickly
open themselves up to unpleasant polemics. Grounded in the fundamental
principles of good academic practice, this account attempts to weigh the
various perspectives against one another, even if the limited space does not
permit the extensive treatment of all theories and controversies. In the spirit

Introductionxiii

of Alexis de Tocqueville, I hope to have written this book without prejudice
but not without passion.
This book was made possible by the generous support of the Freiburg
Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS), which awarded me an eighteen-month
research sabbatical. I am particularly indebted to Ulrich Herbert for inspiring
this project and including it in the German series European History in the
20th Century. Also, I am most grateful to Charles Ingrao for encouraging
the English edition, which was thematically expanded and updated to include
most recent research. Dona Geyer’s thorough translation and the invaluable
comments by two anonymous readers were greatly appreciated. Last but not
least, I thank Purdue University Press and Verlag C.H. Beck for their unfailingly gracious and active support.
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1878
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Austria-Hungary; independence of Serbia and Montenegro;
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Croatia and Vojvodina under Hungarian); emergence of the
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Murder of Serbian king Aleksandar Obrenović; election of
Peter I. Karadjordjević as his successor; Ilinden Uprising
of Macedonians against the Ottoman Empire; “People’s
Movement” and mass protests against the Hungarian governor
in Croatia
1905
Resolution of Fiume calling for Croatian self-rule and general
civil rights and liberties; Serb–Croat party coalition in Croatia;
“New Course” in Serb–Croat cooperation
1906–1911 Austro-Hungarian customs war against Serbia (“Pig War”)
1908
Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary;
Bosnian annexation crisis; partition of Sandžak between Ser
bia and Montenegro; founding of the Serb National Defense
(Narodna odbrana)
1909
First pan-Yugoslav conference of South Slavic socialists
1911
Founding of the Black Hand
1912
Founding of the Balkan League by Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece,
and Montenegro to liberate “European Turkey”; First Balkan
War (against the Ottoman Empire); founding of Albania
1913
Demise of the Balkan League due to conflicts over the partition
of Macedonia; Second Balkan War (between the former allies);
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1914
Assassination of Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand in
Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip; Austro-Hungarian declaration of
war on Serbia; July Crisis and the outbreak of the First World
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1915

1917

1918

Retreat of the Serbian government and army through Albania
to Corfu (“Albanian Golgotha”); occupation of Serbia and
Macedonia by the Central Powers; founding of the Yugoslav
Committee in London, headed by Ante Trumbić
Corfu Declaration; agreement between the Croat-led Yugoslav
Committee and the Serbian government on the founding of a
South Slavic kingdom under the Karadjordjević dynasty
Allied breakthrough on the Salonica Front; surrender of
Austria-Hungary; founding of the National Council of
Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs; secession of South Slavs from the
Habsburg monarchy and resolution to unify with Serbia

1918–1941 The First Yugoslavia
1918
Proclamation creating the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slo
venes (SHS) by King Peter I. Karadjordjević
1919–1920 Paris Peace Treaties; international recognition of the Kingdom
of SHS and the demarcation of its borders; founding of the Free
State of Fiume by Gabriele d’Annunzio
1920
Popular referendum in Carinthia; creation of the Little Entente
with Czechoslovakia and Romania as part of the French security system; introduction of universal male suffrage; elections
to the constitutional assembly; founding and outlawing of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia
1921
Passage of the centralist Vidovdan Constitution despite Croat
boycott; intensification of the Serb-Croat constitutional conflict
1924
Third Party Congress of the CPY with a focus on the national
question (recognition of different Yugoslav peoples/nations)
1925
Treaty of Nettuno on the demarcation of Italy’s borders
1928
Assassination in the Skupština (National Assembly) of the
Croatian Peasant Party politician Stjepan Radić; government
crisis
1929
Suspension of the constitution by King Alexander
Karadjordjević; declaration of a royal dictatorship; renaming
of the SHS state to “Kingdom of Yugoslavia”; administrative
reorganization into banovine; founding of the Croat Ustasha
movement
1930
Intensification of the Great Depression’s impact on Yugoslavia
1931
Constitutional octroi and the introduction of a sham democratic
system
1934
Assassination of King Alexander I in Marseille; regency of
Paul Karadjordjević
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Election of the semiauthoritarian Milan Stojadinović as prime
minister; abatement of Great Depression; state intervention in
the economy; rapprochement with Germany and Italy
Liquidation of farmers’ debts
Failure of the Concordat with the Vatican
Tito´s official appointment to the position of CPY General
Secretary; Serb-Croat Settlement (Sporazum) to create the
autonomous Banovina of Croatia

1941–1945 The Second World War
1941
Entry of Yugoslavia into the Tripartite Pact; military coup
in Belgrade; German attack on Yugoslavia (Operation
Retribution); surrender of Yugoslav army; flight into exile of
the king and his government; dissolution of Yugoslavia; founding of the Independent State of Croatia (under Ante Pavelić);
German military government in Serbia (Milan Nedić’s regime);
annexation of various areas by Italy, Germany, Hungary,
Albania, and Bulgaria; formation of a nationalist Serb resistance movement under Draža Mihailović (Chetniks) and the
Yugoslav communist partisan movement under Josip Broz
(Tito); “general insurrection”; the founding and fall of the
partisan republic of Užice; extreme acts of “retribution” by
occupational forces; massive “ethnic cleansing”; start of the
extermination of Jews and Roma
1942
Battle of Sutjeska; first meeting of the Antifascist Council
of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia Antifascist Council
(AVNOJ) in Bihać
1943
Launching of Operation White and Operation Black by
German military to combat partisans; Battle of Neretva; Italy’s
surrender; second meeting of the Antifascist Council of the
People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce; announcement of creation of a federal and socialist Yugoslavia; Allied
recognition of Tito; partisan military victories
1944
March of the People’s Liberation Army into Belgrade; Vis
Agreement between Tito and the royal exile government on
the re-establishment of Yugoslavia; formation of a common interim government; measures expropriating the ethnic German
population
1945
Unconditional surrender of Germany; Bleiburg massacre; creation of the People’s Front; abolition of the monarchy
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1945–1991 The Second Yugoslavia
1945
Proclamation of the creation of the Democratic Federal
Yugoslavia (DFJ); elections to the constitutional assembly;
Trieste crisis; land reform and state purchasing program for
agricultural produce
1946
Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia
(FNRJ); partition into six equal constituent republics; war
criminal trials; nationalization of large landholdings, banks,
and means of production
1947
Paris Peace Conference; recognition of Yugoslavia’s borders
(annexation of Istria without Trieste)
1948
Break with Stalin; expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform;
political purges
1949
Expulsion from the founding of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance
1950
Introduction of self-management system; Cazin peasant uprising; Yugoslavia’s stance of neutrality between the power blocs
in the East–West conflict
1952
Renaming of Communist Party of Yugoslavia as the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia
1953
Constitutional reform incorporating the self-management
system
1954
Expulsion of Milovan Djilas from the Central Committee of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; normalization of relations with the Soviet Union; Novi Sad agreement on a written
Serbo-Croatian language in two variants
1955
Declaration in Moscow by Khrushchev and Tito on the right
of every country to pursue socialism its own way; Bandung
Conference and the beginnings of the Nonaligned Movement
1957
Severance of diplomatic relations by West Germany in line
with the Hallstein Doctrine
1961
First conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Belgrade
1963
Passage of a new constitution transforming the Federal
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia into the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY); formation of the Praxis group
1964
Eighth Party Congress of the League of Communists; introduction of market-economy reforms and the federalization of the
constitution
1966
Removal of Aleksandar Ranković as the head of the secret
police
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1976
1977
1980
1981
1987

1989

1990
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“Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary
Language”
Student revolts; Albanian uprising in Kosovo and West
Macedonia; recognition of Bosnian Muslims as the sixth
constituent people; introduction of national security doctrine of
“All-People’s Defense”
Islamic Declaration by Alija Izetbegović
Croatian Spring; ousting from power of party leadership in
Zagreb; constitutional amendment expanding the federalization
of Yugoslavia; Brezhnev’s visit to Belgrade
Ousting from power of party leadership in Belgrade; political
purge within the party
Passage of a new constitution; granting of greater authority and
power to the republics and autonomous provinces; confirmation of Tito as president for life
Law on Associated Labor to expand self-management
CSCE meeting in Belgrade
Tito’s death; collective presidency: growing economic problems and national tensions
Kosovo uprising; imposition of martial law; political trials
Rise of Slobodan Milošević to the top of party leadership in
Serbia; party infighting with Serbian president Ivan Stambolić;
memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts;
nationalistic meetings and mobilization efforts; Bosnian
Agrokomerc affair
Election of Slobodan Milošević as Serbia’s president; revocation of autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina; 600th anniversary
celebration of the Battle of Kosovo; economic crisis; growing
conflict over reform within Yugoslavia; institutional paralysis
and legislative backlog
Disbanding of the League of Communists; introduction of
the multiparty system; failure of reforms proposed by Ante
Marković; Franjo Tudjman’s assumption of power as Croatia’s
president; declarations of sovereignty by the parliaments of
Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo; Slovenian referendum on
independence; Serb-Montenegrin veto of the Croat Stipe Mesić
as the president of Yugoslavia; declaration of autonomy by
Croatian Serbs

1991–2018 Collapse of Yugoslavia and Successor States
1991
Violent incidents in the regions of Croatia inhabited by Serbs;
declarations of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and
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1992

1993

1994

1995
1996
1998
1999

2000

2001

2003
2004
2006
2008
2013
2018

Macedonia; deployment of the Yugoslav People’s Army; outbreak of war in Slovenia and Croatia; German recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia; declaration creating the Republic of Serb
Krajina; resolution on independence passed by Bosnian diet
despite Serb veto.
Ceasefire and the stationing of UNPROFOR in Croatia;
founding of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by Serbia and
Montenegro; founding of the Serb Republic within BosniaHerzegovina; independence referendum and international
recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina; outbreak of war; massive
“ethnic cleansing” actions
“War within the war” between Croats and Muslims in BosniaHerzegovina; creation of UN safe areas; establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Shelling of the Markale market in Sarajevo; begin of NATO
air strikes against Serb positions; founding of the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croats and Muslims
Croatian military operations Flash and Storm to retake
Krajina; Srebrenica massacre; Dayton Peace Accord
Founding of the Kosovo Liberation Army
Armed conflict between Albanian guerilla fighters and Serb
security forces in Kosovo; mass exodus and expulsion
Failure of the Rambouillet negotiations for a self-governed
Kosovo; NATO strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo;
UN Resolution 1244 setting up an interim administration mission in Kosovo; start of the process to determine the status of
Kosovo
Defeat of Slobodan Milošević by the democratic opposition in
Serbia; start of the EU Stabilization and Association Process
for the Western Balkan states
Armed revolt by Albanian extremists in South Serbia and
Macedonia; Ohrid Framework Agreement on equal rights for
Albanians
Transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
Accession of Slovenia to the European Union
Referendum on independence and international recognition of
Montenegro
Unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo
Accession of Croatia to the European Union
European Commission’s new Western Balkan Strategy

PART I
The South Slavic Movement and the
Founding of the Yugoslav State
(1878 to 1918)

1.
The South Slavic Countries around 1900:
The Dawn of a New Century
At the turn of the century, optimism prevailed throughout the entire South
Slavic region. Even in very remote corners like the provincial Bosnian town
of Višegrad, wrote the town’s chronicler Ivo Andrić, “events too quickened
their pace. . . . Exciting news was no longer something rare and unusual but
an everyday food and a real need. The whole of life seemed to be hastening
somewhere, suddenly speeded up, as a freshet quickens its pace before it
breaks into rapids, rushes over steep rocks and becomes a cascade.”1 However,
at this point only a few people were aware that they were living in an era of
millenarian changes and that intellectual innovation and political impetus
were also emerging from profound social upheavals. In any case, the young
Bosnian revolutionary Vladimir Gaćinović hoped that the old feudal system,
the major clans, and the patriarchal mindset of his home would soon belong
to the past and that new ideas and a strong push to create a nation state would
emerge.2 Since large areas of the countryside still remained mired in dire poverty and old traditions, the idea of integrating all South Slavs into a single state
appeared to be no more than a pipe dream in the eyes of many people. At the
time it was not evident, let alone certain, that one day their so very dissimilar
regions would indeed merge into a single body politic. It quickly becomes clear
just how complicated the starting point truly was when we retrospectively
comb the historical regions of Yugoslavia in fast motion.

The Historical Regions

At the turn of the century, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were living in two
empires — the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman — and in two independent
nation states — Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, our fictional trip through
the South Slavic countries around 1900 begins in the Austrian crown lands
of Carniola, Styria, Carinthia, Gorizia, Istria, and then moves to Trieste, the
home to approximately 1.32 million Slovenes, who would become the smallest
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population located the farthest west in what would later be the multinational
state of Yugoslavia. In Trieste they made up about three-fourths of the population and lived in confluence with Germans, Italians, Croats, and other peoples.
They were the only group among the South Slavs never to have suffered longer
phases of military threat, wartime destruction, or even depopulation. Their
agriculture was varied and productive, and the standard of living and level of
education were higher here than in the neighboring regions. The architecture
reflected nearly 500 years of Habsburg rule and still today seems quintessentially Austrian. The areas in which Slovenes lived were still split into different
administrative jurisdictions, but even in the past there had never been a state
entity named Slovenia.3
Further west and south, the Slovenian regions passed seamlessly into the
settlement areas of the approximately 2.9 million Croats, who were also part
of Austria-Hungary.4 The Croats exemplified internal fragmentation to an
even greater degree than the Slovenes. They were dispersed throughout no
less than seven separate political-territorial units within the Habsburg monarchy, each with very different socioeconomic structures, ethnic mixes, and
cultural influences. Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed autonomy within the Hungarian
half of the empire. Istria and Dalmatia, however, were under direct Austrian
rule, whereas the port city of Fiume (Rijeka), as a corpus separatum, was
governed by Hungary. Croats also lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in southern Hungary. Until the outbreak of the First World War, not a single railway
connection existed between Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.5
Highly diverse cultural influences intermingled in Croatian regions. In
the cities of northern and eastern Croatia, such as Zagreb, Varaždin, and
Osijek, the Austrian and southern German influences are still evident today
in the baroque style of aristocratic residences and the old town centers and in
the interiors of city palaces and patrician homes. Along the coast, in Dalmatia
and Istria, the architecture in cities like Pula, Split, and Dubrovnik points
to ancient origins as well as to the centuries-long and very close ties to the
cultures and histories of Venice, Florence, and Rome.6
Since 1881, Croatia-Slavonia also had included the former Military
Frontier (krajina), a province under special military administration that existed for 400 years. This area extended along the Sava and Danube rivers
before reaching the Adriatic coast farther south in western Bosnia. In order to
shield its empire militarily from the “Turkish peril,” Vienna had settled Serb
refugees and others as free soldier-peasants in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries and created an administrative district with its own social order.
These “frontiersmen” formed military regiments to defend the monarchy.7
The Habsburgs had also attracted non-Slavic colonists to the area, including
German-speaking Danube Swabians.
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Beyond the Military Frontier lay Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 1878 Congress
of Berlin had placed it under Austro-Hungarian military occupation, while
formally leaving it under the administration of the Ottomans, who had ruled
there since the fifteenth century. In 1908, the Austrian emperor annexed it in
a surprise move, thereby also incorporating into the empire the autochthonous
Muslim population. Around 1900, the South Slavic population totaled about
1.6 million, of which 43 percent were Orthodox Christian, 35 percent Muslim,
21 percent Roman Catholic, and the rest a combination of Jews, Vlachs, Turks,
Roma, and other minorities.
The first thing to stand out in this newly annexed territory was the architectural mastery of the Turkish builders. Sarajevo dazzled visitors with the
magnificence of the Gazi Husrev-beg Mosque, one of the largest and most
artistic religious buildings left by Islam on European soil. Also world famous
was the bold sweep of the stone bridge over the Drina in Višegrad, which,
according to its inscription, could be found “nowhere else in the world.”8 Built
in the fifteenth century on orders of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Paša Sokolović,
a child of the region, this remnant of East–West interlock was immortalized
by Ivo Andrić in his Nobel Prize–winning novel.9 And then there is the Drina
River itself. Originally the Turks and Austrians declared it to be the dividing
line between their empires; later, in the twentieth century, it became a highly
contested site of memory. Was the picturesque river the supportive backbone
of Serb settlement beyond the political borders of Serbia or was it the insurmountable watershed between Catholic and Orthodox civilizations? For their
part, the communists later summarily declared the Drina to be a symbol of
Yugoslav unity.
Under Austro-Hungarian rule, all of Bosnia-Herzegovina was exposed
to central European architectural influences. Sarajevo received a modern
city center with representational administrative buildings, a theater, and a
central post office right next to the Turkish old town with its bazaar — the
Baščaršija — numerous mosques, hammams, Koran schools, dervish monasteries, and caravansaries.10 In the late nineteenth century, the traveler Heinrich
Renner wrote: “looks more Turkish here than in Sofia and Philippopolis; the
regional costume still prevails; turban and fez are preferred,” despite the already “prevalent” European clothing.11
Travel was very strenuous at the time. The trip by coach, caravan, or
horse from Sarajevo to Mostar, located about 84 miles away, lasted three
grueling days. To venture into more remote regions, a person either used one
of the hazardous horse trails or walked.12 Therefore, from eastern Bosnia it
took a difficult climb through the mountains to reach Montenegro, which
had been independent since 1878. For centuries, the seclusion of the Karst
had conserved the traditional clan order. The overwhelming majority of the
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Montenegrin population were Orthodox Slavs, but a few thousand Turkish,
Albanian, and Slavic Muslims also lived there. This tiny country with its
population of about 200,000 always captured the imagination of foreign visitors, in particular, as a symbol for the irrepressible will of a small mountain
people to be free; as the homeland of banditry, blood feuds, and barbarism;
and not least as the stage for comical political conditions. Except for a small
idyllic strip of coastline, the living conditions here were merciless. The country had almost no infrastructure, what cattle-raising and meager farming there
was yielded little, and indescribable poverty prevailed. Deep in the interior,
explained the Montenegrin Milovan Djilas, a close collaborator of Tito, this
land was “extremely barren and crippling quiet,” a place where “all things
living and all things created by the human hand” vanished. “There is no oak,
no white or copper beach, just dry, brittle, barely green grass. . . . Everything
is stone.”13
Crossing the jagged mountains on the arduous zigzag of a Turkish road,
the traveler reached the southernmost point of what would later be Yugoslav
territory, namely the harbor of Bar, and a few miles farther inland, Lake
Skadar, through which the Albanian border would run one day. Along this
narrow coastline, the Mediterranean-Venetian flair returned. For centuries this
area served as the most important and often the only link to western Europe.
Beyond Lake Skadar stretched those regions of the future Yugoslavia that
belonged to the Ottoman Empire until 1912/1913 and were considered particularly backward and poor. The administrative district (vilayet) of Kosovo,
created in 1879 with the capital city of Üsküb (Skopje), included a greater
part of today’s Kosovo and Macedonia, over which Greece, Bulgaria, and
the new nation state of Serbia have fought. More than 1.6 million inhabitants created a unique ethnic and religious mixture. The population was fairly
evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and was split into numerous
language groups.
At the time, special status was given to the primarily Muslim-inhabited
administrative district Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which separated Serbia from
Montenegro. In 1878, the Congress of Berlin conceded to the Austrian emperor the right to occupy the strategically important area. In 1913, it was
divided up between Montenegro and Serbia.
The Principality of Serbia gained de facto semi-independence from the
Ottoman Empire as a result of two uprisings (1804–1813 and 1815–1817).
Autonomy was legally granted in 1830, and independence was internationally
recognized in 1878. In 1900, 2.5 million people lived here, of whom ninetenths were Serbs and the rest Vlachs, Roma, and other diverse groups.14
Another two million or so Serbs lived in the Habsburg monarchy. In the
north, at the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers, stood the originally
oriental-Balkan capital city of Belgrade, which for most of its long history had
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served as a strategically significant border town, military post, administrative
city, and trade center. After the Ottomans left, it was completely reconstructed
in the Western style typical of Vienna and Pest. From here it was just a small
jump to the southern Hungarian province of Vojvodina, from which the Serb
national movement had emerged during the Enlightenment. As a result of the
Austro-Hungarian colonization, the population of 1.3 million then consisted of
Magyars (32 percent), Serbs (29 percent), Germans (23 percent), and numerous
other nationalities such as Croats, Romanians, and Ruthenians.15

Peoples, Nations, Identities
At the turn of the century, around twelve million people lived in the historic
regions of the future Yugoslavia. The majority were South Slavs of Catholic,
Orthodox, and Muslim faiths, and the rest created a conglomerate of various
other ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, including Turks, Albanians,
Germans, Magyars, Jews, Roma, Vlachs, and others.
Local intellectuals and writers, like so many other Europeans of the nineteenth century, believed that communities needed to be organized as “nations”
to secure political participation, cultural rights, and social justice. Nationhood
was mainly understood as a cultural and linguistic category out of which the
proponents of nationalism thought to create an organic whole. Yet, in most
regions, the composition of the population was confusing, to put it mildly.
Over the course of decades, an elaborate history of migratory movements
from various places, religious conversions, and different kinds of cultural
hybridization had thoroughly and repeatedly jumbled and reset the pieces of
the ethnic mosaic. For this reason, contacts, cultural transfers, and cultural
interweaving on various levels always played a major role.
Around 1900, the idea of a “Yugoslav” nation was as obscure as was a
well-defined notion of what it meant to call oneself “Slovene,” “Croat,” or
“Serb.” For peasants, their local communities, language, culture, and religion
were the references important to their world. Granted, the process of modern
nation building had indeed begun during the first third of the nineteenth century, and new and abstract forms of national awareness were emerging from
the identities previously shaped by religion, cultural heritage, and regional
affiliation. However, at this point none of the future Yugoslav peoples had
yet formed an integrated community. The emergence of the modern nation
involved protracted, often contradictory processes with a thoroughly openended result. The idea of a transhistorical existence of peoples, objectified
by language, culture, or origin, is still popular today. Yet it is an idea that is
totally inapplicable historically.
Stated simply, the majority of people living at the turn of the century in
the areas that would later be Yugoslavia were South Slavs, linked by their
language and cultural kinship. According to today’s categories, these were
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Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins, and Macedonians.
According to the identification categories back then, these labels still oscillated between ethnic, national, religious, and regional connotations, which
would contribute significantly to the problem of a future Yugoslavia, as will
be shown here.
Despite the extreme disparities among the political territories and cultural
histories, Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim South Slavs all felt intuitively related. The reason was that they could communicate freely with one another.
Most Croats and all Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians speak the same dialect, known as Štokavian (after the interrogative pronoun što for “what”).16
The nineteenth-century language reformers selected this dialect in 1850 in the
Vienna (Literary) Agreement to serve as the basis of a standardized SerboCroatian language.17 The idioms of the Slovenes and the Macedonians were
distinctly different and would later develop into their own literary languages.
Since the early nineteenth century, intellectuals and societal elites thought
that it would be possible to create (or rather revive) a united South Slavic
nation based on a shared descent, language, and culture. They believed that
South Slavs were a primordial and transhistorical people who had suffered
the unfortunate fate of having been unnaturally torn apart. Their subsequent
fragmentation into Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was considered superficial,
which meant that it was possible and imperative that the South Slavic people
reemerge as a single “Yugoslav” nation despite their present cultural and political differences.
The protagonists of the South Slavic idea were aided in their effort by
a degree of conceptual vagueness: in this context, the vocabulary of local
languages contained just the word narod, a word that made no semantic distinction between “people” and “nation.” Herein lay a creatively exploitable
but also dangerous ambivalence. At the same time, the language lacked a term
for that common idiom referred to then as “Slavic,” “Croatian,” “Serbian,”
“Bosnian,” or simply “naški” (our language). There was no conceptual equivalent to a label like “German” or “French” that would have vaulted local and
regional variations, nor was there a common collective term for the advocates
of South Slavic unity and thus no “positive predisposition” for South Slavic
(Yugoslav) nation building.18
In all of the regions mentioned here, forms of linguistically and culturally
determined awareness that could be called protonational existed already in
the late nineteenth century.19 People identified themselves with certain groups
that distinguished them from other communities by way of various factors
like culture and language, sometimes also religion, social milieu, and regional
origin. In each case, the respective environment determined which of these
criteria stood at the forefront of such self-identification, as the following example of Croatia illustrates.
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If a person traveling through Croatian regions at the turn of the century
had asked peasants about their national affiliation, this individual would have
been given a variety of answers.20 People were already identifying themselves
as “Croats,” but sometimes the label was used to mean ethnicity and other
times to mean regional affiliation. At the same time, people identified themselves — depending on where they lived — as “Slavonian” or “Dalmatian” or
“Istrian.” “The work of unifying the Croats has not yet been completed,”
complained the Croat scholar Julije Benešić in 1911. “The lads from Syrmia
are still ashamed to call themselves Croats publicly.”21
People intuitively considered the Slavic language to be an important identity marker as long as they lived among Germans, Hungarians, or Italians
and a clear language barrier existed. Only then did people identify themselves primarily as “Slav” or “Croat.” In multireligious milieus in which the
language was homogenous, such as in Bosnia or Slovenia, faith became the
main identity marker. Since a Croat could communicate in the same dialect
as Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians, the language criterion alone was not
enough to define who a Croat was. A Croat peasant saw himself primarily
as “Catholic,” “Christian,” or as a “Latin.”22 However, the Croatian national
identity and Catholicism were not yet identical; after all, Germans, Austrians,
Italians, and Magyars were also Catholic. Not until much later, in the 1920s,
would the activities of the Catholic clergy and the Peasants’ Party complete
the integration of the Croatian nation under the recitals of Catholicism.
Unlike Catholicism, the Orthodox Christian Church was already a strong
factor in creating the national identification and integration of the Serbs. There
was a historical reason for this. During the Ottoman period, the religious
communities were organized as quasi-legal entities with certain autonomous rights. These so-called millets had great administrative powers. The
Orthodox Church could appoint church dignitaries and manage the property
of the churches, monasteries, and charity institutions. Family and inheritance
law as well as tax collection was also put in their hands. For an interim, the
Turks granted the Serbian Orthodox Church sovereignty (autocephaly) to be
exerted by the patriarch in Peć in Kosovo. The Serbian church thus became
the sole guardian of the extinct medieval tradition of state. Serbian kings were
worshiped as saints; hagiographic texts were evocative of the golden age and
its demise; bishops acted as both spiritual and political leaders. Therefore,
“Orthodox” was equivalent to “Serbian” both semantically and in meaning
even before the nationalist period. Toward the end of the 1880s, the Serb geographer Vladimir Karić noted that, for the Serb, “it is very important to call
himself ‘Christian,’ or more precisely, ‘Orthodox,’ and he even goes as far as
not to distinguish between the faith and his nationality, so that he calls it the
‘Serbian faith’ and consequently wants to call every person a ‘Serb,’ regardless the ethnicity, if this person is Orthodox.”23 Because of their Orthodox
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religion, many Montenegrins understood themselves to be Serbs at the time.
After all, both peoples had sprouted from the same ethnic soil of the medieval Serbian state, and these common origins and the shared religion are what
exacerbated the split between them, the impact of which is felt still today,
particularly in the hesitancy to affirm the existence of the Montenegrin nation.
The merger of “Orthodox” and “Serbian” remained intact in many regions
until the 1930s. Only later in the twentieth century did the religious meaning
disappear, and “Serbian,” like “Montenegrin,” was recoded to fit into separate
national categories.
Unique in European history has been the identity building of Bosnian
Muslims.24 These people are the descendants of those Slavs of Orthodox,
Catholic, and other faiths who converted — usually voluntarily — to Islam
when the Ottomans conquered the territory. The motives for converting were
manifold and may well have resulted from a mixture of fear and incentive. NonMuslims were confronted with fewer chances to advance, a greater tax burden,
and legal discrimination in matters such as property ownership. Conversion
to Islam occurred especially in places where the Christian churches had not
yet firmly established themselves or competed fiercely among themselves for
power and influence. Upon conversion to Islam, old folk customs were simply
recast into new molds. Occasionally entire families split into a Muslim and a
Christian branch, which served as a type of reinsurance to protect themselves
should power shift again into other hands.25 Outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Slavs in Serbia, Sandžak, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia also converted to Islam.
Islam was the decisive criterion separating Muslims from the others in
Bosnia. It formed social identity, defined norms and values, and prescribed
religious and cultural practices.26 At the turn of the century, the collective
identity of the Bosnian Muslims was still primarily influenced by religion.
They fought for religious and cultural autonomy, not national and political
sovereignty. Only a minority argued for the secularization of the Muslim
community in the modern era, meaning the separation of religion and civil
society. However, a nonreligious, national consciousness did not consolidate
until well into the twentieth century.
In Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, all of which still belonged to the
Ottoman Empire, the confusion was the greatest, and national identity building had advanced the least. In the proverbial Macedonian fruit bowl (in French,
macédoine) lived both Slavic- and Greek-speaking Christians, Turkish- and
Albanian-speaking Muslims, Jews, Vlachs, and Roma. How large each of the
communities actually was became the subject of heated ethnographic and
political controversies.27
According to traditional Islamic order, religion took precedence over ethnic
distinctions. Therefore, Slavs and Greeks living in the Orthodox millet found it
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especially important to identify themselves as “Christian” vis-à-vis the ruling
Turks. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century during a conflict
within the Bulgarian church did the overarching Christian Orthodox community
divide along linguistic lines into Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb sectors. It would
still take several decades before people understood this new differentiation, let
alone internalize it. Slavic-speaking peasants of Macedonia were quite indifferent to their ethnic background until, with the emergence of the “Macedonian
question,” they became the object of competing territorial claims and of ethnographic classifications from Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece.28 At the time only a
hint of a future Slavic-Macedonian national identity could be discerned.
However, for the moment, it was common in Macedonia — as in many culturally heterogeneous border regions like Vojvodina or Istria — for individuals
to be opportunistic in stating their identity. In Skopska Crna Gora, peasants
once admitted that sometimes they were Serbs, sometimes Bulgarians, depending how the question was worded.29 This led the Swedish professor Rudolf
Kjellén to view the population like a type of “flour from which you can bake
any cake that you want, once the nationality has finally been decided.”30
As was true all over Europe, “imagining the nation” was essentially
staged by intellectuals, scientists, politicians, and church authorities. On the
microlevel, it just seemed to be some abstract entity. The coexistence with
people of other faiths was a daily, socially structured, and usually conflict-free
experience for many. Everyone always knew who belonged to which group,
because this was communicated outwardly in names, clothing, religious
practices, and social barriers such as the marriage ban between Christians
and Muslims.
Likewise, mutual respect and good neighborly relations were part of
village life. Birth, marriage, death, as well as house building and harvesting provided occasions for public ritual and festivities through which people
underscored their communality and mutual dependence. People supported
each other beyond regional borders through neighborly help in harvesting and
building (moba and pozajmica) and gathered in the evening to socialize and
work, an activity known as sijelo.
As in many rural regions in Europe, traditional popular piety dominated
over canonical stipulations in the population at large. This also offered many
opportunities for the faiths to mingle. Although people observed the official
holidays of their respective faith, often these were merely the Christian or
Muslim adaptations of original customs. In Serbia, the clergy had learned to
accept that people went to church more to meet each other than to attend the religious service. Priests tolerated the “freer interaction” that believers had with
God and Church, including cults worshipping ancestors and house saints.31 As
late as the 1930s, a study on the Belgrade suburb of Rakovica found that not
one household there possessed a Bible or a New Testament, although everyone
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believed in God: “We could not find these books anywhere or even a single
person who would have known something about them. . . . All that everyone
knows is that there are church books from which the Pope reads prayers.”32
Folk traditions built many bridges between the religious communities.
A person seeking spiritual guidance or praying for a rapid recovery of health
might visit the priest in the morning and, just to be on the safe side, the Islamic
instructor (hodža) in the afternoon. Even today, August 2 is the day on which
the Orthodox Christians celebrate Saint Elias, the Ilindan, and the Muslims
the Alidun, a fact that has found its way into the expression “Do podne Ilija,
od podne Alija” (mornings Elias, afternoons Ali).33
Around 1900, the nation-building process was fully underway throughout the entire region, with a bit of time lag in certain places. However, the
protonational communities (later the Serbs, Croats, Muslims, etc.) had not
yet fully constituted themselves as modern nations. Originally, this was not a
specifically South Slavic phenomenon. In France, Germany, and Italy, simple
peasants also had to be transformed first into members of a nation.34 However,
unlike these parts of Europe, centuries of foreign rule in the Balkans had
enabled room for ambivalence to emerge, in which avenues for identification
through language, religion, and political history overlapped. Among other
factors, there was no clear understanding of what constituted a nation, be it
a common language and culture (as in Germany and Italy) or the tradition of
statehood (as in France). On the one hand, the idea of a Kulturnation — as it
was posited by Johann Gottfried Herder and conveyed in the region — might
have pointed to the integration of South Slavs into one single nation. On the
other hand, the heritage left by the Ottoman era included the phenomenon of
the Konfessionsnation, the confessional nation, which used religious affiliation
as the basis for differentiating among populations who shared a common language. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims spoke (and still speak) similar dialects, but
they increasingly saw themselves as belonging to different peoples because of
their faith. As important as the common cultural roots, shared language, and
regional cohabitation were, the disparate historical-political traditions, especially those rooted in the different religious worldviews, created fissures too
deep to allow the idea of a general Yugoslav identity to gain any ground without having to resort to instrumentalization “from above.” Not until the creation
in 1918 of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes did a strong agency for
socialization develop that actively advanced Yugoslav nation building.

Demographic Development and Family Structures
In the final thirty years of the nineteenth century, all South Slavic countries
experienced far-reaching social and economic change. Population growth,
agrarian and industrial development, and the transition to a monetary and
market-based economy shook up the traditional social order of village life. The
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economic dynamic that developed in the center and west of the European continent was no small contributing factor, one that appeared in the Balkans in the
form of imperialism. Industrial goods needed new markets and accumulated
capital needed new opportunities for investment. Railway construction, transregional markets, and the advancement of the monetary economy changed earlier
forms of economic and communal life, which in turn brought new experiences,
mentalities, and types of awareness. Unlike western Europe, the outlines of a
modern industrial society, however, were only vaguely recognizable.
New dynamics were also developing from within society. Between
1880 and 1910 the population grew rapidly as the mortality rate sank. The
highest demographic growth took place in Serbia (71.3 percent) and BosniaHerzegovina (63.9 percent), followed by Croatia and Slovenia (38.6 percent),
Dalmatia (35.7 percent), and Vojvodina (33.6 percent). The slowest population
to grow was that of Slovenia (9.4 percent).35 Not until the period between the
two world wars did the demographic discrepancy among the regions diminish.
Along with Russia and Hungary, southeastern Europe experienced the highest
birthrate in Europe.36 One of the reasons for the great demographic growth
lay in the extended rural family, the zadruga (household commune). The extended family constituted — except in Slovenia — the core of traditional social
order in the countryside of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania.37 Sons
and grandsons remained in their parental homes, while daughters married
into other zadrugas. Unlike in western Europe, where it was necessary first
to own land or have a craft before setting up a household, which meant that
many people married late or not at all, the socioeconomic net of the enlarged
South Slavic family could always easily integrate additional family members.
People married young and had many children. In eastern and southeastern
Europe, the social order lacked an effective regulatory mechanism like that
which safeguarded western Europe from extreme population growth.
Also unlike western Europe, it was not until this period that the traditional
union of productive and reproductive functions within the family, of home
and workplace, began to break apart. The zadruga represented a community
of property, life, work and authority. Private property did not exist, not even
money. The head of the household was the father, who derived his role as
master from his natural authority. He represented the family in public, managed family and economic business, and had the last word in all important
matters. Women held a subordinate place within the family and had practically
no rights. In this patriarchal society, strict rules of conduct dictated daily life
and limited every individual’s personal freedom. In places where the state had
never gained a foothold, like Montenegro and Kosovo, a strong archaic code
of honor prevailed, one that included blood feuds.
Yet even in the regions of its historical origin, the zadruga began to fall
away in a staggered fashion and at different rates of speed. Factors like the
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growing size of the family, the gradual expansion of the market economy, new
types of employment in industry and trade, and the dissipation of the patriarchal order played a role. More and more households were splitting, usually
when they reached a critical point of twenty to forty members.38 This occurred
earlier and faster in the east and the south. However, around 1890, about a
fifth of the population in Croatia and Serbia still lived in an extended family.

Social and Economic Change

Around the turn of the century, about 85 percent of the population in CroatiaSlavonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina worked in agriculture,
and only about 10 percent earned their living in industry, handcraft, and trade;
the rest worked in independent professions. Only Slovenia differed in this
respect. Here about two-thirds of the population still worked in the agrarian
sector, while 11 percent were employed in mining and industry.39
The South Slavic region was divided into a number of distinct systems
of agricultural law. The manorial system had been ended in 1848/1849 in
Austria-Hungary, so that peasants were the owners of the land they farmed.
This led to a differentiated structure of ownership and social life with several
large modern agricultural enterprises, a wealthy farming middle class, but also
increasing rural poverty. This lay the foundation for an — albeit modest — industrial development. The feudal system in Serbia was also abolished after
the uprisings that occurred from 1815 to 1833. The principle prevailed here,
too, that those who worked the land should own it. In the remaining regions,
various forms of feudal dependency still existed. In Istria and Dalmatia the
systems of colonate (težaština) and socage (kmetije) survived, which obliged
farmers to turn over a portion of their harvest, anywhere from one-fifth to a
half. These systems existed in many different variations. It is estimated that
in 1925 as many as 100,000 peasant families were still working as coloni on
land they didn’t own.40 Feudal relations in agriculture also remained intact in
Bosnia-Herzegovina with the čiftlik system. More than half of the families,
the majority being Orthodox and Catholic socagers, the kmets, were personally unfree, although they did have the right to buy their freedom. They were
heavily burdened with the obligation to turn over a portion (usually a third) of
their harvest. In early 1914, a total of 93,336 kmet families were still working
a third of all arable soil.41 Similar primeval dependencies also prevailed in
Macedonia and Kosovo.
Where agrarian reforms were undertaken, the efforts were half-hearted
and contradictory. Legislators in Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, and Montenegro
tried to prevent the impoverishment of the peasants by upholding the principle of indivisible collective property and lifelong family solidarity. In Serbia,
zadrugas were only permitted to be divided in exceptional cases, and by
1889 in Croatia this was only permitted if the resulting amount of property
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allotted each party did not fall short of a legally stipulated minimum. Efforts
to protect the homesteads (okućje) followed similar ideas. In order to protect
peasants against excessive indebtedness and forced liquidation, a minimum
of 8.5 acres including dwellings, draft animals, and inventory were required
to be mortgage-free and exempt from liquidation. These protective measures
hindered the mobilization of land and labor, the spread of market-based economic relations, and thus the segmentation of property and societal structures
in rural areas.42
For these reasons, the potential surplus population in agriculture seriously
encumbered society throughout the entire Balkan region at the turn of the
century. As the large families split up, landholdings became more and more
fragmented. Land was divided up into small, unproductive parcels; herds of
livestock and machinery were torn apart; all too often an entire house was
dismantled, beam for beam. At least a third of the peasants in the Yugoslav region worked less than five acres of land, another third only up to twelve acres.
Landholdings of any considerable size were only found in central Croatia
and in Vojvodina; they were practically nonexistent in Serbia, Dalmatia, and
Carinthia.43
The result was indebtedness and poverty. Anyone with less than twelve
acres to farm could just barely survive; those who owned less than five acres
were in dire straits. In the period between 1910 and 1912, two-thirds of the
farmers in Serbia could not earn the existential minimum. More than half
of them did not own a yoke of oxen; a third had neither a plow nor even a
bed.44 Poverty was also indescribable in Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the similarity of these circumstances in which
they lived and of the crises they had experienced that would later contribute
considerably to the political merger of the South Slavic peoples.
Agrarian productivity was low, and many households persevered on subsistence farming. Still, step by step, the market economy was making inroads
into rural regions, first in southern Hungary, Syrmia, and Slavonia, later in
Serbia, and finally in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro.
However, this left farming households at the mercy of cyclical fluctuations in
the economy. The majority of them lacked the capital and the knowledge to
intensify their agricultural production. Land use and cultivation techniques
remained primitive with little diversification of produce; artificial fertilizers
and modern farm machinery were unknown, as were root crops and industrial
crops, and little changed in this regard until the interwar period.
The increase in agrarian productivity continued to lag far behind the
dynamic growth in population. Instead of intensifying yields, peasants tended
to increase arable farmland. They turned woods and meadows into grain
fields, reduced livestock farming in favor of crop farming, and shifted their
own eating habits from a meat-based diet to a vegetarian one. Despite these
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efforts, food provision remained precarious. In 28 percent of the Serb farming
households, the food shortages appeared each year by the end of October; in
another 46 percent, the deficit appeared in January and February, all of which
had serious consequences for the nutrition and state of health of the rural
population.45 About a hundred years after much of Europe had been cursed
with rural overpopulation, the South Slavic countries first found themselves
smitten with it, at a point when the curse had long been broken elsewhere.
As in many European societies, people sought a way out of their predicament by migrating in search of work. In doing so, they perpetuated traditional
forms of periodic migratory labor known as pečalba. On the eve of the First
World War, nearly 150,000 men from Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo,
and Macedonia made their way each year into the neighboring regions to hire
themselves out as migratory artisans, wage laborers, or small businessmen.
Istria and Dalmatia were also classic emigration regions.
Later than everywhere else in Europe, transcontinental labor migration
did not take place to a significant degree until the 1880s. Then, between 1899
and 1913, more than a half million South Slavs left for the New World, fourfifths of whom were from the Habsburg monarchy.46 Due to cyclical economic
fluctuations, countries overseas limited immigration starting at the turn of
the century, which meant that emigration provided far less relief to the taxed
job market than had been the case in earlier decades in places like Germany
or Scandinavia. The majority of the structurally underemployed jobseekers
remained in their own country.
The low level of agricultural productivity also hampered development
in trade and industry. Agricultural exports did not generate profits that could
have been invested in industry, nor did a greater domestic demand for finished
goods emerge in rural areas. People were simply too poor to be able to afford
things that they did not produce themselves. Therefore, industrialization in
the South Slavic countries began later, progressed slower, and developed in
other branches than it did in the rest of Europe. Whereas the latecomers,
Sweden and Denmark, did manage to initiate viable industrialization in the
nineteenth century, and Italy, Hungary, and Russia created at least regional
industrial centers, the Balkan countries — as well as Spain and Portugal — did
not experience any substantial industrial growth.47 Nor would there be any
major impetus in industrialization until the 1930s; in fact, the rapid switch to
advanced industrialization did not occur until 1945.
This was caused by a bundle of factors: the backward transportation
infrastructure that hampered the development of transregional markets, the
chronic lack of capital, the low level of education and training, and — last but
not least — the powerful competition from developed regions of the AustroHungarian Empire. Starting at the turn of the century, the number of factories
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and employed workers increased and levels of production grew annually by
more than 10 percent, albeit from a very low starting point. Unfortunately, at
the same time, the discrepancy to the rest of Europe also grew.48 In CroatiaSlavonia, the number of industrial workers rose from 9,832 to 23,604 in the
years between 1890 and 1910. In Serbia, this number had only risen to 16,095
by 1910, despite the efforts made by the government in its industrial policy. In
Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than 65,000 industrial workers were employed in
1912/1913 as a result of the Austro-Hungarian development policy.49
Since proto-industries had been weak in southeastern Europe during the
early modern period, industry developed out of artisan crafts more than out
of manufacturing. It was not textile manufacturing (as in England) or the coal,
iron, and steel industry (as in Germany) that stood at the forefront in the beginning, but agriculture (mills and breweries) and forestry (timber and wood
processing). In 1910, food production generated 55 percent of the revenue of
all factory production in Serbia, while the textile industry only generated 8
percent. In Croatia, the leading branch of industry was timber, and industry
would not start to diversify significantly until 1910.50 Due to the lower level of
technological requirements in this sector, the demand for machinery did not
intensify as a spin-off effect. At first, heavy industry only played a subordinate
role, except in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Austro-Hungarian colonial
regime had ignited a major thrust in industrialization.51

Life in the City

Until the interwar period, urbanization developed moderately and was greatly
influenced by agriculture. Railroad construction, mining, and factories drew
people from the countryside, and cities grew and changed the way they looked.
However, some qualification is necessary here with regard to the use of the
term “city.” On average, a city only had a few thousand inhabitants. In the
thirty years prior to the First World War, the urban population increased
threefold. Still, Belgrade only had 68,481 inhabitants in 1900; Zagreb 57,690;
Sarajevo 38,035 (1895); and Ljubljana 46,000 (1910). The number of migrants
to the cities was enormous, and yet in 1910 only 13.2 percent of the Serb population lived in cities. In Croatia the figure was just 8.5 percent. Only Russia
and Finland had lower figures.52
The migration from the countryside also changed the look and structure of
the (sub)urban areas. The more newcomers arrived, the greater the village way
of life infiltrated daily city life. The mass of urbanites lived under appalling
conditions in small, ground-level farm buildings, not in tenement blocks and
rear buildings as in western Europe. Living space was excessively expensive,
overcrowded, poorly ventilated, squalid, and without any sanitary facilities.
In 1906, an inquiry survey reported among other things “that a close causal
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connection existed between life in such dwellings and the three greatest enemies of public health — tuberculosis, alcoholism, and venereal disease.”53
Only a small, wealthy elite could afford to live in comfortable townhouses.
The cityscape was not dominated by fuming smokestacks and proletarian
hardship, but by the shabby dwellings of former rural inhabitants and small
business dealers as well as the growing army of job-seeking day laborers.54
Every other city dweller in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade still worked in
agriculture. In the suburbs, many farmed plots of land and kept poultry, pigs,
or a cow. Perhaps the most prominent characteristic of southeastern European
urbanization before the Second World War is that many cities were actually nothing more than gigantic villages. The only places that underwent a
“European” urban metamorphosis were Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and a
few mid-sized cities.
In Serbia a great effort was made starting in the 1870s to remove all traces
of the Ottoman past so that, as the city planner Emilijan Josimović expressed
it, the “capital does not retain the form that barbarism gave it.”55 Belgrade’s
reconstruction was modeled on Vienna and its grand circular boulevard, the
Ringstrasse. The only structures that were left as reminders of the 350 years
of Turkish rule were the citadel, two mosques, and a fountain with Arabic
inscriptions.56 Almost simultaneously with western European metropolises,
Belgrade was outfitted in the 1890s with electrical lighting and streetcars,
and after 1900 with canalization and a water supply system.57 Irrespective of
the modest conditions from which the reconstruction was starting, the city
planners were driven by the desire to simply skip over the laborious catch-up
process and to hitch up an “airplane motor to the oxen cart,” as an observer
put it.58 Belgrade became a paradigm of modernity, a shop window displaying
a culture that was more or less imitating the West.
About 1900, daily life and habits in the cities changed at a breathtaking
pace, evident first in the spread of traditional costumes (građanski kostim).
In Belgrade, hats and felt caps replaced the traditional fez. Instead of gathering together in the evening, as was widely done in the villages, the elegant
reception day žur ( jour de réception) became fashionable among the Belgrade
upper class.59 Also in other cities of the South Slavic region, the upper eschelons of society began to adopt European forms of socializing and lifestyles,
such as salons, leisure activity, and interior design.60 Bourgeois attitudes toward romantic love and marriage ideals also began to take hold.
However, there were also interactions between the distant worlds of the
townhouse and the farmhouse. Lifestyle, fashion, and etiquette gradually
made inroads into everyday peasant life. “Where a wooden cup had once
been enough, one now finds a glass; the petroleum lamp replaces kindling
wood,” a foreign traveler observed in 1897. “European farm wagons with iron
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fittings are replacing the old prehistorical vehicle with the creaking wooden
wheels.”61 Whereas the respective local folk costumes were still being worn in
the countryside up to the end of the nineteenth century, the men and women in
the cities were already wearing West European clothing. Changes in customs
spread from the cities outward. People began to address each other with the
formal form of “you” instead of the more commonly used familiar form and
to greet each other with the words “dobar dan” (good day) — known as the
“German form” of greeting.62

Progress and Uncertainty
The desire for national emancipation was generated not least by the awareness
of how backward things were. Members of the elite considered liberation from
foreign rule to be the prerequisite for a better future and an emancipatory
strategy to further development that would finally enable the people of the
region to participate in European civilization as members of equal standing.
Yet the harbingers of the new European era, like technical progress, bourgeois
culture, and liberal social morality, descended upon agrarian society in southeastern Europe so suddenly that the changes severely shook the long-standing
mainstays of identity and uprooted traditional values and societal relations. In
particular, the countries formerly under Ottoman rule experienced a profound
break with the traditions of their Muslim heritage, which had shaped daily life
and society for four hundred years. Radical societal change subdued people’s
optimism about progress and caused anxious uncertainty about the future. The
key question was how their own social-cultural identity was to be reconciled
with the new challenges facing them.
Since the Enlightenment, the intellectual elite of southeastern Europe
had cultivated the idea of societal progress, which they associated with words
like “reason” and “science” and equated with “Europeanization.” 63 During the
nineteenth century, the enthusiasts of this intellectual interaction with Europe
were young students attending higher schools of learning and universities in
Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, and Austria. Over the course of
the next few decades, a Europe-oriented intelligentsia emerged from their
ranks, comprised of people familiar with the ideas of liberalism, socialism,
and Russian populism.64 At the same time, Muslim educated classes were
adopting Islamic ideologies and movements from the Arab world, Asia, and
Russia.65 Islamic scholars also studied European philosophy intensely, especially rationalism. In view of the decline of the once powerful Ottoman
Empire, they asked, how were the administrative, economic, military, and
judiciary achievements of the West to be explained? 66
The younger generations thirsted after answers to the big questions of
this new era. How could the curse of backwardness be overcome and the
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intellectual and technical level of “Europe” achieved? Which means were best
to fight the prevailing patriarchal mentality and to create a sense of national
identity among the rural population? How could the interests of the great
powers be confronted and a body politic organized?
The educated classes of southeastern Europe took all the major intellectual and political movements of Europe (or of the Islamic world) with a grain
of salt. However, this does not corroborate a popular stereotypical assumption
that the absence of the Reformation and the Enlightenment caused the Balkans
to harbor long-standing, specifically anti-Western attitudes hostile to modernization.67 The decisive factor was not the fundamental differences between
the civilizations of the Latin West and the Orthodox or Islamic East, but the
fact that the reception of major ideas took place under thoroughly different
societal circumstances. At the turn of the century, more than four-fifths of
the population made their living from agriculture. Anyone seeking to gain
widespread resonance for their ideas at a time when developments were only
beginning to politicize the mass public still had to take into consideration the
attitudes, values, and interests of the peasantry.
Up to that point, it had not been possible to develop an industrial society modeled on the West, even though there were clear indications that the
political system, public life, national cultures, lifestyles, and value orientations in the cities were undergoing a gradual process of embourgeoisement.68
Conditions for this had been particularly favorable in Slovenia, Croatia, and
Slavonia. In the nineteenth century, a small bourgeoisie had developed from
the ranks of the traditional urban classes, wealthy farmers, the nobility, artisans, merchants, government bureaucrats, and military officers. What the
newly emerging business circles increasingly yearned to see was the industrial
production associated with smoke billowing from ever more factory chimneys.
Their vocabulary was augmented by new words like “producers,” “competition,” “business cycles,” “capitalism,” and “working class.”69 The situation
was quite different in the peasant societies formerly under Ottoman rule,
because the majority of the urban Muslims had emigrated at the time when
the Ottoman influence was being eradicated in these regions. The creation of
a bourgeoisie here, as in Serbia, had to start literally from scratch. However,
in less than three generations, a new social elite had developed that consisted
of people from poor rural circumstances who had risen to higher posts in
government service or established themselves in independent professions.
In all of the South Slavic countries, improved educational opportunities
in rural communities and greater regional mobility among the well-schooled
and university-educated youth proved to be a powerful motor for an intellectual and national awakening. Back in the 1860s and 1870s, the first generation
educated abroad had brought the ideas of liberalism to Serbia, which was also
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reflected in the political system established in 1881. Both the ruling Progress
Party and the Liberals favored the idea of imitating the Western path to development as quickly as possible, in order to abolish the “limitations of outdated
patriarchal Serbia.”70 But only a small elite were convinced of the feasibility to
simply impose the European model of progress on their own country through
a type of “revolution from above.” Serbia lacked the underlying support of
the bourgeois classes, who could have anchored the Western type of modernization more firmly into local society. Besides the royal family, a total of
six millionaires lived in Belgrade in 1900; in Zurich alone there were 500.71
It was not the economic sphere but the political one that provided the
realm in which to develop all things new. Every party in Serbia took up the
cause of political freedom, yet no party had worked out a clear economic reform program. This demonstrates a nearly unbridgeable gulf between political
modernity and economic backwardness. The Serb newspaper Dnevni List
(Daily Newspaper) illustrated it in the following way: “Nowhere else in the
world can one see the miraculous and absurd situation that modern ideas of
political and social progress are advocated in the parliament by village cashloan givers, former municipal cops, and illiterate bench-sitters and chicken
sellers.”72
This entire debate over catch-up development and Europeanization occurred against the backdrop of an intensifying competition between the major
powers in the era of imperialism. Granted, the Balkans had been the object of
hegemonic power projection for centuries.
However, advanced industrialization and economic global expansion created hegemony of a new sort at the end of the nineteenth century. Increasingly
the aim was to secure new markets and capital-intensive investments. Trade
policy, lending policy, and railway construction created new economic dependencies that the new Balkan states found hard if not impossible to avoid
at first. After the Congress of Berlin, Serbia had been forced to sign disadvantageous trade contracts with Austria-Hungary and soon fell deeply into
debt. Between 1880 and 1914, its liabilities grew from 16.5 million to 903.8
million French francs.73 For this reason, the debate on Europeanization was
always accompanied by a fear of foreign dependence, as is illustrated in the
controversy of railroad construction.
At the beginning of the 1880s, Serbia and Montenegro were the only
countries in Europe without a railway system. In parliament there was stiff
resistance to the railroad construction stipulated by the Congress of Berlin.
Was Serbian society even ready for the technological revolution, asked the
members of parliament? Didn’t the imposed modernization intently create
new dependencies on foreign lenders? Serbia would “suffer the same fate
as the Indians following the discovery of America,” it was said. Think of

22

Part I: 1878 to 1918

Columbus, who “brought European culture to America, but with it also the
chains of slavery.”74
Broadly speaking, the elites in Serbia and Montenegro split into two
main groups that roughly equated the distinction between “Liberals” and
“Conservatives” in Europe or between “Westerners” and “Slavophiles” in
Russia: namely, a European-modern and a Slavic-traditional group.75 While
the liberal, state-oriented “Westerners” pushed for the separation of church
and state and for institutional, legal, and constitutional reform, the conservative, community-oriented “traditionalists” tended to cultivate the autochthon
roots of a meta-historical, natural, and organically perceived national identity. Although both movements envisioned a better future, the former greatly
emphasized institutional change, while the latter stressed a distinct élan vital
of the Slavs.76
Parallel to this and in a process observable throughout the entire Islamic
world, the Muslim intelligentsia also developed two wings, a European-laicist
and an Islamic-religious one.77 Members of the former group had been educated in secular schools and at European universities, opposed traditional,
religious erudition, and favored a secular, politically determined concept of
nation. However, the majority of the intelligentsia still adhered to the Islamic
type of Bosnian Muslim collective identity. Muslims had been catapulted
into a new world by the Austro-Hungarian project to impose European civilization. The former political legitimacy of Islam, as it had been universally
understood, had been forced to give way to a heteronomous and secular state
legitimacy imported from the West, one that fundamentally rocked its social
and cultural core. The challenge before them was to harmonize all that was
new with that which was tried and tested, to conjoin the universal aim of
modernization with the preservation of cultural-religious identity. But how?
During these years, the popularity of the reformist movement of Salafism,
which reinterpreted ancient writings in pursuit of what the reformers considered true Islam, helped introduce two different strategies of adaptation.
One strategy postulated the compatibility of Islam with Western rationalism
and recommended the “modernization of Islam.” It was argued that faith and
science had not been contradictory even in earlier eras. In his work Islam
and Culture, published in 1894, Osman Nuri Hadžić, for example, proposed
a rational-enlightened model for the future.78 The other, at first less popular
strategy emphasized the universality and values of the religion and pushed for
an “Islamization of modernity.” Pan-Islamism was also part of this tradition of
thought, an idea that found a voice in the magazine Behar (Blossom) starting
early in the twentieth century.79
All this discourse on modernity, progress, and the future appears closely
connected to that on cultural identity, collective values, and national assertion
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and dignity. As was the case throughout Europe, the new challenges prompted
strong counterreactions. Anxiety about the future and antimodern reflexes
were cloaked in egalitarian debate; rural traditions, local self-administration,
and the extended family were adjured, in order to fight off the subversive trend
of the new era. Wasn’t the contrived finery of the capital, Belgrade, which so
flagrantly contradicted the poverty-ridden world of the masses, no more than a
subversive attack against Serbia’s socially just, agrarian society? Why should
the capital city lead the outside world to believe in its progress and high culture
when in reality the countryside was plagued with poverty?80
It was against this backdrop around the turn of the century that the fundamental dichotomy between urban and rural emerged, a dichotomy between
modern, Western-influenced urbanity, on the one hand, and village life with its
traditional social culture, on the other. The city represented the condensation
of all hopes and fears with regard to modernity; it was the metaphor both for
progress and decline, the promise for a better future and the signal to return to
the old social and moral order. What is more, the urban–rural dichotomy also
symbolized the social dividing line between “rulers” and “people,” between
the “city-coat wearers” (kaputaši) and those wearing peasant costume.
As was typical for all of Europe, this confrontation between the familiar and the foreign, between the supposed security provided by patriarchal
values and the attractions and adventures of urban progressivity served as
a blueprint for numerous literary works.81 “Progress” was often perceived
as culturally foreign and thus radicalized fears of a loss of identity and a decline of morals — fears articulated in Serbian literature by Laza Kostić, Đura
Jakšić, or Stevan Sremac and in Bosnian literature by Safet Beg Bašagić and
Edhem Mulabdić.82 Urban and rural became symbolic representations for the
contrary forces of change and persistence and for the contradictory fears of
a return to atavism and barbarism, for some people, and of the irretrievable
loss of the tried and true, for others. An entire legion of ethnographers, village
researchers, and historians set out to trace the true roots of Serbian, Croatian,
and Slovenian culture and to reconstruct the pastoral world of peasantry as a
counterweight to the raw industrial present. Often modernity meant foreignness, even alienation, “something that should be eliminated,” as a member of
the Serbian parliament expressed it.83
Both the Liberals and the Radicals in Serbia tried to dissipate the tensions
between traditional social structures and patriarchal values, on the one side,
and the needs of modern constitutionality, economic management, and governance, on the other. As legislators, they thus repeatedly relied on established
common law when reforming agrarian, family, and trade and commercial law
in order to retain tested and trusted social institutions of village life and thus
avoid the upheaval of capitalism.84 This was consistent with the thinking of

24

Part I: 1878 to 1918

the socialist Svetozar Marković, one of Serbia’s most important intellectuals
in the nineteenth century. Influenced by Russian revolutionaries, he advocated
an agrarian socialism that was based on the societal order of the village and
emphasized the self-administration (samouprava) of the traditional extended
family (zadruga) and the community (opština). He considered collective
ownership and collective production to be the more humane alternative to
the exploitative capitalistic state.85 The following generation of politicians
also thought technology and science should be advanced, but — according to
Nikola Pašić, the leader of the Radical Party — they both were to be used in
the “Slavic-Serbian spirit.”86 This was also very similar to the position of the
founders of the Croatian Peoples’ Peasant Party.
The majority of Muslim intellectuals decided to favor a pragmatic strategy that adopted a select number of European standards, just as Turkish and
Egyptian authors had. Bosnian spiritual leaders found citations in classic
writings to justify to their fellow countrymen why they should enter military service in the hated Christian army. Compromise was recommended
in other questions as well, such as in the matter of integrating the sharia
into the Habsburg legal and justice system.87 The predominant paradigm was
therefore not to fetishize the past or the religion, let alone some nebulous
anti-Westernism, but to attempt to reconcile the imported ideas, values, and
structures with the dominant societal conditions.
By the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the glorified view
of the Balkans as an exotic and romantic region was no longer able to bear
up against societal realities. Just as everywhere else in Europe, the emerging
industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, and other fundamental
processes of modernity had already shaken traditional agrarian society to
the core, even though industrialized, urbanized society with its characteristic
ways of life, aesthetics, and scientific-technological momentum would not
fully develop until decades later. The socioeconomic upheavals in Europe’s
southeast region became noticeable later than in western Europe and occurred
slower, less dynamically, and in other directions. Compared with England,
France, and Germany they appeared modest; even Russia and Italy were far
more advanced. Still, measured against what had existed before, the change
was indeed spectacular not only because it created younger, mobile, and educated generations who carried forth the spirit of change, but also because
it intensified tensions between social experiences and political realities and
thus brought about nationalism. In this sense, an irreversible transformation
process was forging ahead that not only thoroughly changed socioeconomic
realities but also pushed the national question high up on the political agenda.

